BACKGROUND
In 2006, then-Governor Christine Gregoire launched WHTAP as part of her attempt to expand social welfare benefits while respecting budgetary constraints (Blackmore and Budenholzer 2009) . As one state official noted: "We will be looking for emerging or fast-growing technologies that could have the biggest impact on the state's budget" (Wahkiahum County Eagle 2007) .
As set forth by the Revised Code of Washington (RCW) 70.14.080-70.14.140, and operating under the state's Health Care Authority (HCA), the medical directors of the agencies that dispense the majority of health care funds-the Department of Labor and Industries, the Department of Social and Health Services, the Department of Corrections, and the Department of Veteran Affairs-designed the program (Washington State Legislature 2006) . They work with the HCA director to select committee members and technologies to be evaluated and implement the committee's decisions (Washington Healthcare Authority, 2016a) . Stakeholders, including industry, insurance companies physicians, and patients may submit recommendations for technologies to be reviewed, but over our study period, their requests carried little weight.
The committee is composed of practicing physicians drawn from a variety of specialties and subspecialties along with several allied health professionals. Members have been screened for first-hand experience with evidence-based medicine and for potential conflicts of interest. They serve terms of 3 years, with two renewals possible, and are compensated on a per diem basis. The administrative staff is small (under five) as is its annual budget (approximately $1.2 million) (Eaton 2013) . As stipulated by the original legislation, the collection and initial evaluation of the relevant clinical data is outsourced to "evidence vendors" who review the literature and deliver a lengthy report on findings to the committee (Washington Healthcare Authority, 2016a) .
The committee meets four times a year, setting coverage policies for two technologies at each session. The meetings follow set procedures. In keeping with the state's Sunshine provisions, sessions are open to the public. State agency medical directors and staff sit off the table but begin the proceedings by explaining why they selected the particular intervention for committee consideration. Although legislation lays out criteria for agencies' selections, in practice the process was not transparent (Washington Healthcare Authority 2016b) .
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The public then has the opportunity to deliver timed 5-minute remarks, but otherwise must remain silent (Washington Healthcare Authority 2016a) . Evidence vendors then present their report and answer committee inquiries. They are provided with "Key Questions" to guide their research, which include study design, methods, and outcomes. An outside "clinical expert" is also present to respond to committee members' specific questions. The presentations concluded and the committee discusses the findings and formally votes on coverage.
State agencies are responsible for implementing decisions. They may bring up technologies for rereview after 18 months. Evidence reports and final decisions are available online. There is no other formal dissemination process.
METHODS
We attended WHTAP meetings over a 5-year period (10 in total, beginning in March 2011). We examined documents produced by and for WHTAP, including reviews by evidence vendors; committee decision reports; annual reports; periodic memoranda; printed materials distributed at WHTAP's open meetings; independent evaluations; and state agency reports. We held informal discussions with several state agency medical directors as well as WHTAP staff, all of whom were cooperative. In addition, we reviewed the literature on evidence-based medicine and technology assessment in the United States and abroad.
RESULTS
Between May 2007 and December 2013, WHTAP evaluated the efficacy, safety, and cost-effectiveness of 39 diagnostic and therapeutic technologies (see Exhibit 1) (Washington Healthcare Authority 2017a) . Of the technologies, 14 were diagnostic and 25 were therapeutic. Although many specialties were represented, orthopedics (14 reviews, 36 percent), radiology (six reviews, 15 percent), and cardiology (six reviews, 15 percent) predominated.
For each technology, the committee issued findings on safety, efficacy, and cost-effectiveness, assigning a high, medium, or low score to each. Safety included risks of a procedure and potential adverse side effects. Efficacy considered the strength of evidence for positive or negative outcomes, including comparisons with alternatives. Cost-effectiveness examined the possible impact of an intervention on state agency budgets as well as its value compared to less expensive alternatives. The committee decided whether to cover a technology, cover it with conditions, or deny coverage. Cover with conditions was the most frequent outcome, and it occurred in 26 technologies (67 percent). The conditional coverage varied according to such criteria as recipients' age, treatment history, and potential enrollment in a clinical trial. Refusal to cover occurred in 10 technologies (26 percent). Only three technologies received blanket approval (8 percent). In each instance, the committee found strong evidence of safety, efficacy, and cost-effectiveness compared to alternatives. In orthopedics, the committee approved coverage of nine of 14 technologies (64 percent); rates of coverage were higher for radiology (83 percent), cardiology (83 percent), and surgery (80 percent).
Following its deliberations and vote, the committee issued a formal report online of its coverage decision, summarizing the evidence on safety, efficacy, and cost-effectiveness (Franklin and Budenholzer 2009) . Some reports linked the decision directly to the committee's evaluation of the evidence; others, however, did not. Unlike the USPSTF, WHTAP did not assign specific grades or numbers to its evidence evaluation and coverage decision. Nor did it consistently explain whether its decision reflected an absence of data, poor quality of data, or negative outcome findings. By our own analysis of the committee reports for the 10 technologies denied coverage, lack of demonstrated efficacy was the major consideration, followed by lack of safety. The least determinative was cost-effectiveness. Cost-effectiveness did become relevant when WHTAP evaluated new technologies that required substantial capital outlays. The committee limited coverage for robotic-assisted surgery (Da Vinci equipment requires a $2 million investment) (Lee 2014) . It allowed proton beam therapy (with an outlay of $145-150 million) only for ocular, central nervous system, and pediatric cancers (Whelan and Langreth 2009 ). The committee ruled out its most frequent use, prostate cancer, because evidence of efficacy was weak. The committee also refused coverage for routine breast screening with MRIs, upright MRIs, or virtual colonoscopy on the grounds that outcomes were no better than with less costly alternatives.
The committee's analysis of robotic-assisted surgery (RAS) illustrates its approach (Washington Healthcare Authority 2012b). The evidence vendor compared RAS to standard open laparoscopic surgery for 25 procedures, reporting evidence of "low to moderate strength" for shortened hospital stays, longer operating times, and higher costs for purchasing, using, and maintaining the technology. Findings on comparative effectiveness between the RAS and laparoscopic approach were also "insufficient or low overall strength."
At the WHTAP meeting, public comments came predominantly from surgeons, all of whom extolled the new technology and urged full coverage. The committee itself, however, noted a "dreadful" absence of data. "There's not a single randomized or nonrandomized clinical trial" (Washington Healthcare Authority 2012a). It first considered a "no coverage" decision for RAS, but thought that was too extreme. "I have trouble saying," declared one member, "we will no longer pay for the procedure if you turn on the robot. . . But at the same time, I don't think there's any sort of strong evidence that thing is adding value such that the state should be shelling out some extra money for it" (Washington Healthcare Authority 2012a). In the end, the committee voted to cover it "with conditions." It did not allow "additional payment for use of RAS beyond that for the underlying procedure." State agencies were also to encourage providers "to clearly identify when RAS is used," so as to build a patient database for outcome analysis (Washington Healthcare Authority 2012a) .
Reviewing its own record, WHTAP took credit for saving the state nearly $32 million between May 2007 and December 2010 (Lessler, Fotinos, and Morse 2014) . It estimated that denial of coverage for virtual colonoscopy saved $11 million; limits on CT angiography, $5 million; its rejection of upright MRIs, $3 million; and spinal cord stimulation, $1.8 million. So too, in 2012, the committee asserted that since inception, it had saved the state The selection and composition of the committee is a particular strength. By including a diverse representation of physician and health care professionals, decisions reflect a wide set of perspectives. By comparison, in both CHBRP and ICER, MDs serve as the primary clinical experts. Moreover, evidence-based decision making is facilitated by a strict disclosure of conflicts of interest. Committee members' clinical experience and outside clinical expert promotes a detailed review of the evidence. Unlike federal programs, cost is a consideration, especially with new and expensive technologies. Finally, WHTAP meetings are open to the public with the opportunity for stakeholder comment. By comparison, only MEDCAC holds public meetings.
Nevertheless, WHTAP procedures have important limitations. For one, analyses of available clinical evidence have shortcomings, some reflecting the program's procedures, others, the state of research (Sox 2010) . The availability and quality of the evidence varied considerably. The committee had a clear preference for randomized controlled trials (RCTs) and often wished to differentiate among subsets of patients. But much of the outcome data the committee would want to consider did not exist. For example, there were no RCTs for robotic surgery outcomes. Even when evidence was available, its quality often fell short because design was weak, the sample size was small, or the period of study too limited.
For another, the committee's preference for RCTs has been a source of controversy at public meetings. Physicians believed their bedside experience was being discounted and patients feared their well-being was being compromised. Industry stakeholders took issue with this exclusion as well (Pinson, Gordon, and Curtis 2015) . This was especially true when the most recent data were not RCTs but favorable observational studies or case reports. The lack of high-quality data was compounded by variation in evidence vendors' research methodologies. Some evidence vendors included only RCTs; others incorporated prospective studies and case reports. Although committee members closely questioned the vendor, they ultimately had to rely on its research findings.
Other technology assessment programs have developed methodologies that allow inclusion of a variety of evidence. By weighting studies by quality, they maintained a preference for RCTs but also included other data in their analyses. For example, CHBRP acknowledges that while "observational studies are less rigorous than are RCTs" they should be evaluated whether they are the only source of information on relevant outcomes, such as subsets of patients (CHBRP, 2013b (CHBRP, , 2014 . ICER uses an evidence matrix which assigns a joint rating based on magnitude of net benefit and level of certainty (Ollendorf and Pearson 2016) .
For still another, the committee did not have a consistent and rigorous methodology for reviewing and translating evidence to decisions. They rated technologies in terms of safety, efficacy, and cost-effectiveness as high, medium, or low. But what constituted a low versus medium or high rating was poorly defined, and how they arrived at these judgments was often unclear. The relative importance of the three criteria was not made explicit. When the committee issued a noncoverage decision and cited "insufficient evidence," it was not apparent whether the conclusion reflected an absence of evidence or compelling data indicating lack of safety or efficacy. In contrast, the USPSTF not only has defined ratings for both magnitude of net benefit and certainty of net benefit but has also developed a simple formula that translates these two ratings into a recommendation decision (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 2008a,b).
WHTAP's charge to include cost-effectiveness in its decision making proved difficult to accomplish. First, it did not consistently distinguish between cost impact, cost savings, and cost-effectiveness. Second, it was unclear how cost-effectiveness was measured. Third, although WHTAP was often confronted with a dearth of evidence on cost-effectiveness, it did not have a strategy to address gaps in knowledge. By contrast, CHBRP employs an actuary and cost model to help evaluate the costs of benefits it reviews. Fourth, WHTAP's analysis of the financial impact of its coverage decisions was insufficient. Its claims of cost savings of nearly $95 million since its inception were undocumented. Finally, information on how state agencies translated committee findings into practice and realized cost savings was not available. While WHTAP may have contributed to substantial cost savings, supporting evidence was lacking.
Finally, beyond the challenges associated with the financial impact of the program, there are no data available on the clinical impact of the committees' decisions. Data demonstrating changes in utilization and outcomes before and after coverage decisions were missing.
CONCLUSIONS AND KEY LESSONS
Given its unique responsibility and overall strong performance in overseeing Washington's health care coverage, WHTAP is a useful model for consideration by other states. Our analysis of its procedures and achievements highlights its strengths and suggests key lessons for improvement of the WHTAP program as well as for other states that might adopt similar strategies:
• Develop methodologies for reporting and evaluating variation in the quality and quantity of existing clinical data. Clarify whether ratings refer to amount of evidence, quality of evidence, or strength of effect
• Establish clear and consistent guidelines for linking ratings to decisions so as to enhance the decision-making process.
• Make available information on how state agency leaders, or other state bodies implement decisions
• Ensure a standard methodology for evaluating cost-effectiveness and release better documented financial data of cost savings.
• Release clinical data on the impact of coverage decisions and encourage research for continued program improvement. Data showing how utilization has changed after committee actions would be particularly useful.
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